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ABSTRACT 
 
Privacy-preservation for sensitive data has become a challenging issue in cloud computing. 
Threat modeling as a part of requirements engineering in secure software development provides 
a structured approach for identifying attacks and proposing countermeasures against the 
exploitation of vulnerabilities in a system. This paper describes an extension of Cloud Privacy 
Threat Modeling (CPTM) methodology for privacy threat modeling in relation to processing 
sensitive data in cloud computing environments. It describes the modeling methodology that 
involved applying Method Engineering to specify characteristics of a cloud privacy threat 
modeling methodology, different steps in the proposed methodology and corresponding 
products. We believe that the extended methodology facilitates the application of a privacy-
preserving cloud software development approach from requirements engineering to design. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many organizations that handle sensitive information are considering using cloud computing as it 
provides easily scalable resources and significant economic benefits in the form of reduced 
operational costs. However, it can be complicated to correctly identify the relevant privacy 
requirements for processing sensitive data in cloud computing environments due to the range of 
privacy legislation and regulations that exist. Some examples of such legislation are the EU Data 
Protection Directive (DPD) [1] and the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) [2], both of which demand privacy-preservation for handling personally identifiable 
information. 
 
Threat modeling is an important part of the process of developing secure software – it provides a 
structured approach that can be used to identify attacks and to propose countermeasures to 
prevent vulnerabilities in a system from being exploited [3]. However, the issues of privacy and 
security are really two distinct topics [4] as security is a core privacy concept, and the current 
focus of the existing threat modeling methodologies is not on privacy in cloud computing, which 
makes it difficult to apply these methodologies to developing privacy-preserving software in the 
context of cloud computing environments. 
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In 2013, the Cloud Privacy Threat Modeling (CPTM) [6] methodology was proposed as a new 
threat modeling methodology for cloud computing. The CPTM approach was originally designed 
to support only the EU DPD, for reducing the complexity of privacy threat modeling. 
Additionally, there were weaknesses in threat identification step through architectural designs in 
the early stages of Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) that demanded improvements. 
 
This paper describes an extension of the CPTM methodology according to the principles of 
Method Engineering (ME) [5]. The method that has been applied is one known as “Extension-
based”, which is used for enhancing the process of identifying privacy threats by applying meta-
models/patterns and predefined requirements. This new methodology that is being proposed 
provides strong methodological support for privacy legislation and regulation in cloud computing 
environments. We describe the high-level requirements for an ideal privacy threat modeling 
methodology in cloud computing, and construct an extension of CPTM by applying the 
requirements that were identified. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background to these 
developments by outlining the CPTM methodology and existing related work. Section 3 
describes the characteristics that are desirable in privacy threat modeling for cloud computing 
environments. Section 4 describes the steps and products for the proposed new methodology. 
Section 5 presents the conclusions from this research and directions for future research. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
The CPTM [6] methodology was proposed as a specific privacy-preservation threat modeling 
methodology for cloud computing environments that process sensitive data within the EU’s 
jurisdiction. The key differences between the CPTM methodology and other existing threat 
modeling methodologies are that CPTM provides a lightweight methodology as it encompasses 
definitions of the relevant DPD [1] requirements, and in addition that it incorporates 
classification of important privacy threats, and provides countermeasures for any threats that are 
identified. 
 
For the first step in the CPTM approach, the DPD terminology is used to identify the main 
entities to cloud environments that are in the process of being developed. Secondly, the CPTM 
methodology describes the privacy requirements that must be implemented in the environment, 
e.g., lawfulness, informed consent, purpose binding, data minimization, data accuracy, 
transparency, data security, and accountability. Finally, the CPTM approach provides 
countermeasures for the identified threats. Detailed description of the CPTM methodology steps 
have been discussed in [6] (Sections 3, 4 and 5). 
 
While the CPTM methodology was the first initiative for privacy threat modeling for cloud 
computing environments in accordance with the EU’s DPD, it nevertheless does not support 
other privacy legislation, such as that required under the HIPAA [2]. In this paper, we identify the 
CPTM methodology weaknesses such as support for different privacy legislation and threat 
identification process and refine the methodology by applying an Extension-based ME approach. 
 
There has been a significant amount of research in the area of threat modeling for various 
information systems with the goal of identifying a set of generic security threats [7], [8], and [9]. 
There are guidelines for reducing the security risks associated with cloud services, but none of 
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these include an outline of privacy threat modeling. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) 
guidelines [10] are not thorough enough to be referred as a privacy threat model because they are 
not specific to privacy-preservation. 
 
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) has identified a broad range 
of both security risks and benefits associated with cloud computing, including the protection of 
sensitive data [11]. Pearson [4] describes the key privacy challenges in cloud computing that arise 
from a lack of user control, a lack of training and expertise, unauthorized secondary usage, 
complexity of regulatory compliance, trans-border data flow restrictions, and litigation. 
 
LINDDUN [12] is an approach to privacy modeling that is short for “likability, identifiability, 
non-repudiation, detectability, information disclosure, content unawareness, and non-
compliance”. This approach proposes a comprehensive generic methodology for the elicitation of 
privacy requirement through mapping initial data flow diagrams of application scenarios to the 
corresponding threats. The Commission on Information Technology and Liberties (CNIL) has 
proposed a methodology for privacy risk management [13] that may be used by information 
systems that must comply with the DPD. 
 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF A PRIVACY THREAT MODELING 
METHODOLOGY FOR CLOUD COMPUTING 
 
This section describes the features that we believe a privacy threat model should have in order to 
be used for developing privacy-preserving software in clouds in an efficient manner. Based on 
the properties that are identified, we then apply the Extension-based methodology design 
approach to construct an extension of the CPTM for supporting various privacy legislation in 
Section 4. 
 
3.1. Privacy Legislation Support 
 
Methodological support for the regulatory frameworks that define privacy requirements for 
processing personal or sensitive data is a key concern. Privacy legislation and regulations can 
become complicated for cloud customers and software engineering teams, particularly because of 
the different terminologies in use in the IT and legal fields. In addition, privacy threat modeling 
methodologies are not emphasized in existing threat modeling methodologies, which causes 
ambiguity for privacy threat identification. 
 
3.2. Technical Deployment and Service Models 
 
Cloud computing delivers computing software, platforms and infrastructures as services based on 
pay-as-you-go models. Cloud service models can be deployed for on-demand storage and 
computing power can be provided in the form of software-as-a-service (SaaS), platform-as-a-
service (PaaS) or infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) [14]. Cloud services can be delivered to 
consumers using different cloud deployment models: private cloud, community cloud, public 
cloud, and hybrid cloud. Table 1, outlines the five essential characteristics of cloud computing 
[14]. 
 
 
 
232 Computer Science & Information Technology (CS & IT) 
 
3.3. Customer Needs 
 
The actual needs of the cloud consumers must be taken into consideration throughout the whole 
life cycle of a project. Additionally, during the course of a project, requests for changes often 
arise and these may affect the design of the final system. Consequently it is important to identify 
any privacy threats arising from the customer needs that result from such change requests. 
Customer satisfaction can be achieved through engaging customers from the early stages of threat 
modeling so that the resulting system satisfies the customer’s needs while maintaining adequate 
levels of privacy. 
 
3.4. Usability 
 
Cloud-based tools aim at reducing IT costs and supporting faster release cycles of high quality 
software. Threat modeling mechanisms for cloud environments should therefore be compatible 
with the typical fast pace of software development in clouds-based projects. However producing 
easy-to-use products with an appropriate balance between maintaining the required levels of 
privacy while satisfying the consumer’s demands can be challenging when it comes to cloud 
environments. 
 
3.5. Traceability 
 
Each potential threat that is identified should be documented accurately and be traceable in 
conjunction with the associated privacy requirements. If threats can be traced in this manner, it 
means that threat modeling activities are efficient in tracing of the original privacy requirements 
that are included in the contextual information and changes over the post-requirement steps such 
as design, implementation, verification and validation. 
 
Table 1, The five essential characteristics of cloud computing [14] 
 
Cloud Characteristic Description Application 
 
On-demand self-service For automatically providing a 
consumer with provisioning 
capabilities as needed. 
 
Server, Time, Network and 
Storage 
Broad network access For heterogeneous thin or thick 
client platforms. 
Smartphones, tablets, PCs, 
wide range of locations 
 
Resource pooling The provider’s computing 
resources are pooled to serve 
multiple consumers using a 
multi-tenant model. 
 
Physical and virtual resources 
with dynamic provisioning  
 
Rapid elasticity Capabilities can be elastically 
provisioned and released, in some 
cases automatically, to scale 
rapidly outward and inward with 
demand. 
 
 
Adding or removing nodes, 
servers, resource or instances 
Computer Science & Information Technology (CS & IT)                                233 
 
Measured service Automated control and 
optimization of a resource 
through measuring or monitoring 
services for various reasons, 
including billing, effective use of 
resources, or predictive planning. 
Storage, processing, billing, , 
bandwidth, and active user 
accounts 
 
4. METHODOLOGY STEPS AND THEIR PRODUCTS 
 
Motivated by the facts that privacy and security are two distinct topics and that no single 
methodology could fit all possible software development activities, we apply ME that aims to 
construct methodologies to satisfy the demands of specific organizations or projects [17]. In [5], 
ME is defined as “the engineering discipline to design, construct, and adapt methods, techniques 
and tools for the development of information systems”. 
 
There are several approaches to ME [17], [15] such as a fundamentally “ad-hoc” approach where 
a new method is constructed from scratch, “paradigm-based” approaches where an existing meta-
model is instantiated, abstracted or adapted to achieve the target methodology, “Extension-based” 
approaches that aim to enhance an existing methodology with new concepts and features, and 
“assembly-based” approaches where a methodology is constructed by assembling method 
fragments within a repository. 
 
Figure 1 represents different phases in a common SDLC. Initial security requirements are 
collected and managed in the requirements engineering phase (A). This includes identifying the 
quality attributes of the project and assessing the risk associated with achieving them. A design is 
composed of architectural solution, attack surface analysis and the privacy threat model. Potential 
privacy threats against the software that is being developed are identified and solutions are 
proposed to mitigate for adversarial attacks (B). The proposed solution from the design phase is 
implemented through a technical solution and deployment (C). This includes performing static 
analysis on source code for software comprehension without actually executing programs. The 
verification process (D) includes extensive testing, dynamic analysis on the executing programs 
on virtual resources and fuzzing as a black-box testing approach to discover coding errors and 
security loopholes in the cloud system. Finally, in the Validation phase the end-users participate 
to assess the actual results versus their expectations, and may put forth further change requests if 
needed. 
 
Our proposed methodology identifies the privacy requirements in the Requirements Engineering 
step, as shown in Figure 2. The results from the Requirements Engineering, which include 
specifications for privacy regulatory compliance, are fed into the Design step, where activities 
such as specifying the appropriate cloud environment, identifying privacy threats, evaluating 
risks and mitigating threats are conducted. Then the produced privacy threat model would be 
used in the implementation step finally it would be verified and validated in the subsequent steps. 
 
Cloud stakeholders and participants such as cloud users, software engineering team and legal 
experts will engage in the activities shown in Figure 2 to implement the threat model in context 
of steps A and B in Figure 1. Cloud software architect as a member of the software engineering 
team initiates a learning session to clarify the methodology steps and their products, privacy 
requirements (introducing the law title that is needed to be enforced in the cloud environment), 
and quality attributes such as performance, usability. The legal experts will identify the definitive 
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requirements that ensure the privacy of data in the platform. In the Design step, the cloud 
software architect presents architecture of the developing cloud environment for various 
participants. This will result in a unified terminology to be used in the privacy threat model. 
 
 
Figure 1, Privacy Threat Modeling in Requirements Engineering and Design of a SDLC 
 
 
Figure 2, Overview of the Extended CPTM Methodology Steps 
 
The rest of this section outlines the implementation model of the steps represented in Figure 2. 
 
3.1 Privacy Regulatory Compliance 
 
Interpreting privacy regulatory frameworks can be often complex for software engineering teams. 
In the privacy regulatory compliance step, learning sessions with privacy experts, end-users and 
requirements engineers facilitates the elicitation of privacy requirements (PR). For example, in 
the EU DPD some of the privacy requirements are: lawfulness, informed consent, purpose 
binding, transparency, data minimization, data accuracy, data security, and accountability [6]. 
Each of the requirements that are identified will be labeled with an identifier, e.g., (PRi), name 
and description to be used in later stages. 
 
3.2 Cloud Environment Specification 
 
To ensure that the final cloud software will comply with the relevant legal and regulatory 
framework, several of the key characteristics that are affected by cloud computing services 
(including virtualization, outsourcing, offshoring, and autonomic technologies) must be specified. 
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For this purpose, the physical/logical architectures of the deployment and service model can be 
developed according to the following steps 
 
• Step A: Define the cloud actors [18] (such as Cloud Consumer, Cloud Provider, Cloud 
Auditor, Cloud Broker, and Cloud Carrier). Cloud consumer is a person or organization 
uses service from cloud providers in context of a business relationship. Cloud provider 
makes service available to interested users. Cloud auditor conducts independent 
assessment of cloud services, operations, performance and security of the deployment. 
Cloud broker manages the use, performance and delivery of cloud services and 
establishes relationships between cloud providers and cloud consumers. Cloud carrier 
provides connectivity and transport of cloud services from cloud providers to cloud 
consumers through the network. 
 
• Step B: Describe a detailed model of the cloud deployment physical architecture where 
the components will be deployed across the cloud infrastructure. This should give details 
of where the components will be deployed and run, for example, the operating system 
version, the database version, the virtual machine location, and where the database server 
will run. 
 
• Step C: Describe the logical architecture of the cloud services model where the major 
cloud services, along with and the relationships between them that are necessary to fulfill 
the project requirements, are recorded. This should include the data flow and connections 
between the relevant cloud services and actors. Note that in this context, an entity is a 
cloud service with a set of properties that meet a specific functional requirement. 
 
• Step D: Describe the assets that need to be protected, the boundaries of the cloud and any 
potential attackers that might endanger either the cloud environment or the assets that 
have been identified as being associated with that particular cloud. 
 
The cloud environment specification step consists of composing an architectural report including 
assets that are subject to privacy protection, cloud actors, physical architecture of the deployment 
model, and logical architecture of the service model. 
 
3.3 Privacy Threat Identification 
 
In this step, privacy threats against the PRs that were established in section 3.1 will be identified 
and analyzed. To achieve this, the system designers will undertake the following steps. 
 
• Step A: Select a privacy requirement from the PR list for threat analysis, e.g., (PR2). 
 
• Step B: Correlate identified cloud actors (Step A from Section 3.2) with the actor roles 
that are defined in the project’s privacy law. For example, correlating the Data 
Controller role as a Cloud Consumer, or the Data Processor role as a Cloud Provider 
in the DPD. 
 
• Step C: Identify all the technical threats that can be launched by an adversary to privacy 
and label them in the specified cloud environment. Each identified threat can be named 
as a T(i,j), where i indicates that threat T that corresponds to PRi and j indicates the 
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actual threat number. For example, in T(2,5) 2 indicates relevance of the threat to PR2 
and 5 is the actual threat number. 
 
• Step D: Repeat the previous steps until all PRs are processed. 
 
The threat identification step consists of composing an analysis report including a list of threats 
including id, name, date, author, threat scenario for each class of the PRs. 
 
3.4 Risk Evaluation 
 
In this step, all actors participate to rank the threats that have been identified in Section 3.3 with 
regard to their estimated level of importance and the expected severity of their effect on the 
overall privacy of the cloud environment. The Importance indicates the likelihood of a particular 
threat occurring and the level of the Effect indicates the likely severity of the damage if that 
threat against the cloud environment were carried out. 
 
Assume there are three identified PRs (PR1, PR2, PR3) in addition to related privacy threats 
T(1,4), T(2,1) and T(3,3) from previous steps for an imaginary cloud system. In this imagined 
cloud, various participants in the project such as Alice (Cloud Consumer), Bob (Cloud Provider), 
Dennis (Software Architect), Tom (Lawyer) and Rosa (Cloud Carrier) evaluate the corresponding 
risk of each identified threats, as illustrated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2, Prioritization of the identified threats, L (Low), M (Moderate), H(High) 
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This step results in composing a risk evaluation report similar to the example in Table 2. This 
report prioritizes the importance and effects of the privacy threats and it will be used in the Threat 
Mitigation step in Section 3.5. 
 
3.5 Threat Mitigation 
 
In this step, the threat modeling team propose countermeasures to the threats that were identified 
in the previous step as having the highest likelihood of occurrence and the worst potential effects 
on the cloud environment. Each countermeasure should clearly describe a solution that reduces 
the probability of the threat occurring and that also reduces the negative effects on the cloud if the 
threat was carried out. 
 
Finally, the recommended countermeasures from this step should be documented and fed into the 
implementation step to be realized through coding and for their effectiveness to be assessed by 
static analysis. In the later stages of verification and validation, each such countermeasure will be 
evaluated and approved by the participants. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this paper we identified the requisite steps to build a privacy threat modeling methodology for 
cloud computing environments using an Extension-based Method Engineering approach. For this 
purpose, we extended the Cloud Privacy Threat Modeling (CPTM) methodology to incorporate 
compliance with various legal and regulatory frameworks, in addition to improving the threat 
identification process. 
 
In future research, we aim to apply the proposed methodology within domain independent clouds 
that process sensitive data. This will validate our methodology for providing customized privacy 
threat modeling for other privacy regulations, such as HIPAA, in cloud computing environments. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This work funded by the EU FP7 project Scalable, Secure Storage and Analysis of Biobank Data 
under Grant Agreement no. 317871. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, Official Journal (OJ) 1995, L 281, p. 31. 
 
[2] Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA)”, 1996. 
 
[3] F. Swiderski and W. Snyder, Threat Modeling, Microsoft Press, 2003. 
 
[4] S. Pearson, “Privacy, Security and Trust in Cloud Computing”, Computer Communications and 
Networks, Springer London, pp 3-42, 2013. 
 
238 Computer Science & Information Technology (CS & IT) 
 
[5] S. Brinkkemper, "Method engineering: engineering of information systems development methods and 
tools", Information and Software Technology, Vol. 38, No. 4, 1996, pp. 275-280 
 
[6] A. Gholami, A.-S. Lind, J. Reichel, J.-E. Litton, A. Edlund, and E. Laure, “Privacy threat modeling 
for emerging biobankclouds,” Procedia Computer Science, vol. 37, pp. 489 496, 2014. 
 
[7] B. Schneier, “Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment”, View (2000), 214-229.  
 
[8] Y. Chen, “Stakeholder Value Driven Threat Modeling for Off the Shelf Based Systems”, IEEE 
Computer Society 2007, 91-92.  
 
[9] S. Baek, J. Han, Y. Song, “Security Threat Modeling and Requirement Analysis Method Based on 
Goal-Scenario”, Springer Netherlands 2012, 419-423. 
 
[10] The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA). Security guidance for critical areas of focus in cloud computing 
v3.0, (2011), https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance/csaguide.v3.0.pdf, visited October 2013. 
 
[11] D. Catteddu and G. Hogben, “Cloud computing. Benefits, risks and recommendations for information 
security”, ENISA Report, 2009. 
 
[12] M. Deng, W. Kim, R. Scandariato, B. Preneel and W. Joosen, “A privacy threat analysis framework: 
supporting the elicitation and fulfillment of privacy requirements”, Requir. Eng., 2011, 3-32. 
 
[13] CNIL. Methodology for Privacy Risk Management, (2012). Available at: 
http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/CNILManagingPrivacyRisksMethodology.pdf, visited 
October 2013. 
 
[14] NIST SP 800-145, "A NIST definition of cloud computing", [online] 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf. 
 
[15] R. Rahimian and R. Ramsin, “Designing an agile methodology from mobile software development: a 
hybrid method engineering approach,” in 2nd Int. Conf. on Research Challenges in Information 
Science, Marrakech, pp. 337- 342, 2008. 
 
[16] K. Kumar, R. J. Welke, "Method Engineering: a proposal for situation-specific methodology 
construction", in Systems Analysis and Design: A Research Agenda, 1992. 
 
[17] J. Ralyté, R. Deneckére, C. Rolland, "Towards a generic model for situational method engineering", 
in Proc. of CAiSE'03 (LNCS 2681), 2003, pp. 95-110. 
 
[18] R. B. Bohn, J. Messina, F. Liu, J. Tong, and J. Mao, "NIST cloud computing reference architecture," 
in 2011 IEEE World Congress on Services. IEEE Computer Society, 2011, pp. 594-596. 
 
 
AUTHORS 
 
Ali Gholami is a PhD student at the KTH Royal Institute of Technology. His research 
interests include the use of data structures and algorithms to build adaptive data 
management systems. Another area of his research focuses on the security concerns 
associated with cloud computing. He is currently exploring strong and usable security 
factors to enable researchers to process sensitive data in the cloud. 
 
 
Computer Science & Information Technology (CS & IT)                                239 
 
Professor Erwin Laure is Director of the PDC - Center for High Performance 
Computing Center at KTH, Stockholm. He is the Coordinator of the EC-funded 
"EPiGRAM" and "ExaFLOW" projects as well as of the HPC Centre of Excellence for 
Bio-molecular Research "BioExcel" and actively involved in major e-infrastructure 
projects (EGI, PRACE, EUDAT) as well as exascale computing projects. His research 
interests include programming environments, languages, compilers and runtime systems 
for parallel and distributed computing, with a focus on exascale computing. 
